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THE TOBACCO LITIGATION
AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
Daniel J. Capra, Lester Brickman, Michael Ciresi, Barbara S. Gillers,
and Robert Montgomery
PROF. CAPRA:1 Welcome to the Philip D. Reed Chair Panel Dis-
cussion on Tobacco Litigation and Attorney's Fees. I have the honor
of holding the Philip Reed Chair, and part of that is a working chair to
get stellar people like this up here to talk to you.
As you all know, the tobacco industry has entered into multibillion-
dollar judgments with the states.2 I would like to provide a short fac-
tual background and then stand out of the way.
The litigation on behalf of the states was brought by private law-
yers, as I am sure you are aware, working under contracts with the
states calling for them to get a certain percentage of any recovery.
Four states settled individually with the tobacco industry: Mississippi,
Texas, Florida, and Minnesota.3
The Minnesota litigation came closest to judgment. The settlement
in Minnesota came on, I believe, the morning of the day on which
Michael Ciresi, who is on the panel, was to make closing arguments to
the jury charging the tobacco industry with decades of fraud, antitrust
violations, illegal marketing of cigarettes to children, and the like.
That litigation also forced the tobacco industry to turn over hundreds
of incriminating documents. The settlement in Minnesota was for $6.6
billion.4 After the Minnesota case was settled, Mr. Ciresi agreed to
nullify his contingent fee contract, which would have netted his firm
$1.5 billion in fees-that is the report. Instead, he settled for a lesser
fee to be paid by the tobacco industry defendants. A suit by an ac-
tivist lawyer and a legislator in Minnesota was dismissed challenging
that arrangement.5
The settlements for the other three individual states were for more
than $32 billion, although there is apparently some dispute because it
1. Philip D. Reed Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
2. See Milo Geyelin, States Agree to $206 Billion Tobacco Deal, Wall St. J., Nov.
23, 1998, at B13; see also Bob Van Voris, Questioning That $206B Tobacco Deal, Nat'l
LJ., Dec. 14, 1998, at A8 (describing attempts by a prominent anti-tobacco activist to
delay the approval of a multi-billion dollar deal between the tobacco industry and
forty-six state attorneys general).
3. See Daniel Wise, State May Share in Settlement of Tobacco Case, N.Y. LJ.,
Dec. 24, 1998, at 1.
4. See Lawyers First to Get Paid: In the Minnesota Tobacco Case, the State Must
Wait, Nat'l LJ., June 15, 1998, at A13.
5. See Bob Van Voris, That $10 Billion Fee: The New Tobacco Deal Will Generate
the Largest Fee Ever-and It May Grow, Nat'l LJ., Nov. 30, 1998, at Al.
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might go up, according to a most-favored-nation clause, because the
Minnesota judgment was more favorable per citizen in the state. 6
The tobacco settlements with these three states called for an arbi-
tration panel to determine the amount of fees to be awarded.7 In De-
cember, that panel awarded around two dozen plaintiffs' attorneys in
those three states $8.2 billion for their work, and that was about a
quarter of the total settlement.8 More than $3 billion of that amount
was awarded to the Florida attorneys, to be paid out over a fairly long
period, a similar proportion going to the plaintiffs' lawyers in Texas.
Actually, in Texas that award was more than they would have received
pursuant to their contract with the state.
One member of the arbitration panel, former Federal Judge Charles
Renfrew-who was chosen by the tobacco industry for the panel, I
might add-dissented from the award, arguing that the attorneys were
entitled to about eight percent of the settlement, or about $2.5
billion.9
Finally, there is a settlement negotiated by the remaining forty-six
states in the amount of $206 billion.'" Most of the lawyers' fees will be
determined in that litigation by basically the same arbitration process
as was awarded in Texas, Florida, and Mississippi. The agreement also
provides that lawyers may negotiate directly with the tobacco industry
as long as they agree to waive all their rights under the contracts that
they entered into with the states."' These negotiated fees, if they de-
cide to take this route, are to be paid out within five years, capped at
$1.25 billion.
With arbitration, if they choose to go that way, the payouts are lim-
ited to $500 million per year, but there is no limit on the maximum
amount that a lawyer can recover, and it can be greater than the ac-
tual contracted-for fee. If the lawyers go through arbitration and it is
less than the actual fee, my understanding is that they can then go to
the states for the differential.
There has been some fallout from all of this large money rolling
around. In Texas, a new Attorney General has announced an investi-
gation into the fee payments of certain lawyers challenging their
fees."2 In Florida, as we will speak about tonight, some of the trial
attorneys for the state objected when the state sold them out and basi-
6. See Paul Elias, Judge, Now Arbitrator, Is in Thick of Tobacco Case, Nat'l L.J.,
Jan. 11, 1999, at A6.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Geyelin, supra note 2.
11. See id.
12. See Susan Borreson, New AG Starts Tobacco Probe, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 1, 1999, at
A4.
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cally reneged on the contract and they were forced to go through the
arbitration process. 3
A final cautionary factor is that the Senate, considering a failed
$516 billion national-tobacco-settlement proposal last year, actually
appeared to accept a proposal to cap attorney's fees in that bill, but it
did not pass.' 4
In light of all this activity and all this money, it seemed appropriate
to hold a panel discussion and debate on the policies and professional
responsibility issues of the attorneys' fees in tobacco litigation, as well
as contingent fees generally. We have the privilege of having an out-
standing panel-I cannot believe they are all here-to discuss these
matters. I will introduce them in the order in which they will make
opening statements. After the opening statements, we will have a
more free-flowing discussion and take questions from the audience.
First, Lester Brickman is a Professor of Law at Cardozo Law
School, where he teaches legal ethics and contracts. He has written
extensively on the subject of attorneys' fees, including co-authoring a
major book, entitled Rethinking Contingent Fees. 5 He has been a
leading advocate of congressional regulation of attorneys' fees in to-
bacco litigation, and was and is heavily involved in the drafting of leg-
islation in Congress that would impose caps on attorneys' fees.
At the other end of the table we have Bob Montgomery, a principal
in the law firm of Montgomery & Larmoyeux in West Palm Beach,
Florida, where he is a noted and very well-respected plaintiff's lawyer.
He was the lead counsel for the State of Florida in the suit against the
tobacco companies, which eventually resulted in a settlement of more
than $11 billion.' 6
Michael Ciresi is a partner at Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi in
Minneapolis. As stated, he was the lead trial attorney in the action
brought by the State of Minnesota against the tobacco companies. He
was also heavily involved in major litigation involving Honeywell,
Arco, Ford, and the Dalkon Shield, and he served as chief counsel to
the Government of India in the actions arising out of the industrial
accident at Bhopal.
Barbara Gillers is counsel to Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacob-
son, practicing in the area of the law governing lawyers, and advising
lawyers on regulatory matters. Before joining the firm, she practiced
for nine years as the first Deputy Chief Counsel to the First Judicial
Department Disciplinary Committee, where she handled a lot of com-
plex litigation and prosecutions. She is also, as I know from personal
knowledge, a respected authority on lawyers' ethics at the City Bar.
13. See Joel S. Perwin, Don't End Contingency Fee System, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 31,
1998, at A20.
14. See S. Res. 2264, 104th Cong. § 519 (1998).
15. Lester Brickman et al., Rethinking Contingency Fees (1994).
16. See Mark F. Bernstein, A Big Fat Target, Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1997, at A14.
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With that, I would like to open up with Lester and his views.
PROF. BRICKMAN: Thank you.
I guess it is pretty clear from Dan's remarks why we are here. It is
because of the fees generated by the settlements, the magnitude of
those fees, which is literally beyond capture by mere words, or cer-
tainly any words that I could think of.
As Dan indicated, the fees are mostly being set by arbitration, and I
conclude that they will amount to at least $15 billion over the next
twenty-five years and will continue to accrue at the rate of $500 mil-
lion a year thereafter for probably at least a half-century or more. I
have suggested elsewhere that fifty years from now, as mankind trav-
els to the outer reaches of the solar system, lawyers will still be clip-
ping their annual $500 million-a-year coupons.' 7
Calling the fee-setting process, the dominant one in this area, "arbi-
tration" I suggest is a bit of a stretch. In most instances, two of the
three arbitrators were effectively controlled by the lawyers. Indeed,
the fee arbitration process itself was set up to divert public attention
from the contingency fee agreements that turned out to be wildly ex-
cessive. Given the fact that the arbitration process is simply a fig leaf
to hide the real fee-setting process from public view, it should come as
no surprise that there is virtually no acknowledgement in the settle-
ment agreements of the role of rules of legal ethics.
Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, in criticizing a Senate
amendment, which Dan referred to, to limit tobacco fees to even
$4000 a hour as too stingy, said: "A lawyer is a legal business
person."'18
With all due respect to the Minority Leader and his position that "a
deal is a deal," lawyers are not simply businesspeople. They are fidu-
ciaries, and doubly so when they are representing the people of a
state. Under the rules of legal ethics, promulgated partly as a justifi-
cation for the legal profession's self-governance, fees cannot be
"clearly excessive. "19 Indeed, that standard has now been superseded
in most states by an even more rigorous standard: fees have to be
"reasonable."2
Are these fees, which in many cases amount to effective hourly
rates of return of tens of thousands-and even hundreds of
thousands-of dollars an hour, reasonable? I think to ask the ques-
tion is to answer it.
17. See Lester Brickman, Will Legal Ethics Go Up in Smoke?, Wall St. J., June 16,
1998, at A18.
18. Id. (quoting Sen. Tom Daschle).
19. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106(A) (1983).
20. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5 (1998); see also Mich. Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.5 (1998) (adapting the standard set forth in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct); Wyo. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5 (1998)
("A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable.").
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Even more disturbing is the fact that no one in this process is even
raising the ethics issue-not the trial lawyers certainly; not the attor-
neys general with whom they are in partnership; not the tobacco com-
panies; not legal ethicists, the folks that write the legal ethics case
books or draft the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers;2 ' and not even John Q. Citizen, who is really pre-
cluded from doing so.
What other arguments are raised in this question of fees?
Well, the "Junior Sultan of Brunei Club" also argues that the fees
are justified by the risks that they undertook. Now, there is certainly
some substance to this argument for some of the attorneys, though far
less than meets the eye. Some of you may recall that there was signifi-
cant documentary evidence in some cases obtained from the files of
tobacco-industry lawyers that was quite incriminating, and which sur-
faced before this round of lawsuits began.
The lawyers who spearheaded the tobacco litigation effort sought to
sign up attorneys general and, therefore, were privy to the disclosures
with regard to their own degree of success in enlisting the attorneys
general to their cause. This was of critical importance with regard to
the risk issue, because the strategy employed to beat the tobacco com-
panies was not a matter of law, or at least less a matter of law, than
one derived from the protocols of war: mass your troops and over-
whelm the tobacco companies by allying with enough state attorneys
general to raise the financial threat to intolerable levels. Success in
this political endeavor dramatically reduced the risks involved.
There is much more to the risk calculus than I can present in the
course of this evening. I do think one anecdote is worth telling, which
concerns the twenty-five percent contingency fee contract in Florida.
The lawyer who secured the Florida Legislature's unknowing passage
of a law to allow suit by the state against tobacco companies, which
not only stripped the companies of their defenses but virtually de-
clared the outcome in the case, stated that enactment of that legisla-
tion made success in the state's suit "a virtual slam-dunk."' That's
what he said. I suggest that a twenty-five percent contingency fee in a
virtual slam-dunk case is prototypically an excessive and unreasonable
fee.
Lawyers also argue, and I presume we will hear some of these argu-
ments tonight, that since their centimillion- and billion-dollar fees are
being paid directly by the tobacco companies on top of, instead of in
most cases out of, states' recoveries, it is free money, it's nobody's
business. I do not think these arguments are availing either.
21. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (Proposed Final Draft
No. 2, 1998); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996).
22. 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 16, 1998) (quoting Fred Levin, Esq.).
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To the tobacco companies, dollars are dollars, whether paid to
states or paid to lawyers. So the real amount on the bargaining table
was not the $246 billion that the states settled for, but a larger sum,
including the amount to be paid to the attorneys. Had the states' at-
torneys general instead bargained for and obtained $20 billion more,
that might have left a mere $5 billion for the lawyers. Stated simply,
because dollars are fungible, the fees are coming out of the
settlements.
Finally, in addition to the ethical violations, the policy implications
of the alliances formed between states' attorneys general and the con-
tingency fee lawyers strike me as being of great concern, and I suggest
it should be of great concern to you as well.
First, consider the use of the awesome power of a state against an
unpopular defendant-who is more unpopular than big tobacco?-
solicited by contingency fee lawyers motivated by finding the keys to
Ali Baba's cave. Normally, as a matter of policy, we do not allow the
use of the power of government for self-enrichment, since such a
power inevitably is abused. We do not allow judges or prosecutors to
take a percentage of the award because we know how that will impact
on their behavior.
Moreover, consider what Mr. Montgomery might have said in his
closing argument to the jury in Florida-and please excuse the lack of
eloquence: "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, friends, citizens, tax-
payers: Do you want to pay taxes to the State of Florida out of your
hard-earned dollars, or do you want these demon tobacco companies
to pay a big chunk so that you will have to pay less? Think about it.
The choice is yours."
Second, in our system of government, public policymaking is largely
consigned to state legislatures, which are in turn responsible to the
electorate. This is the core of our republican form of government.
The tobacco settlements, I suggest, undermine the fundamental struc-
ture of that governmental form. The settlements, in reality, are public
contracts between the states and the tobacco companies that effectu-
ate certain public policies regarding the advertising and sale of to-
bacco products, in some cases determine how the tobacco payments
are to be spent, and in all cases violate state laws that require appro-
priations of state funds to be approved by the legislature.
This is public policy writ large. Indeed, these alliances are nothing
less than a new source for the creation of public policy.
What happens when legislatures are urged to, but fail to, ban or
burden the sale of tobacco-or, for that matter, guns or butter or
beer? We know that big tobacco, as well as the gun industry and man-
ufacturers and sellers of artery-clogging, brominated polysaturated
foods and alcoholic beverages, have a great deal of political muscle.
Should the courts step in through the litigation process and do what
the legislatures refused to do?
(Vol. 672832
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According to a New York Times editorial recently, such a resort to
litigation is justified because the legislature has not acted, when of
course it should have, and "so far nothing else has worked."'
When self-interested groups, however, fail to convince voters of the
merits of their position, and instead resort to the courts and obtain
through that litigation process equivalent policy outcomes that affect
all of us, they deny the electorate the political accountability that our
representative form of government is intended to bestow. Alliances
directed against disfavored deep pockets that conjoin the power of the
state with the enormous capital base of the contingency fee bar dis-
play awesome-and indeed, I think, frightening-power, power that is
being exercised outside of the ordinary machinery of representative
government.
It is not the people's representatives who are making the critical
choices; it is contingency fee lawyers acting for heretofore unimagined
profits, states' attorneys general who do not run for election on the
basis of the policy choices that are at stake here, and unelected judges,
or if they are elected, who do not run for office on the basis of
whether tobacco or guns or butter or beer should be regulated, or
even banned.
I do not know how this power will be curbed, but I think it must be.
I do know that, having been so successful with the first of these alli-
ances, the contingency fee bar is already planning the next alliance
with government for private gain. For me, that is a chilling prospect.
Thank you.
PROF. CAPRA: I have the sense that a gauntlet has been thrown
down. I would like to ask Bob Montgomery to respond.
MR. MONTGOMERY: Dan, thank you very much.
You are not going to be tested on this, so just relax and I'm going to
tell you a story. I got a phone call from the Governor's office-this
was February of 1995-and it came from Fred Levin, a lawyer in Pen-
sacola who was very friendly with the Governor. I went to school with
the late Governor Lawton Chiles. Fred said to me, "Look, we are
putting together a trial team and we're going to take on tobacco." He
said, "Are you familiar with the statute?"'24 I said I really hadn't read
the statute. He said, "Well, it was passed."
I said, "Fred, wait a minute. You want me to be a member of a
team? You know, there are 800 cases that have been tried against
tobacco and none of them have ever been won. And you are asking
me to risk whatever it takes-you tell me"-which in my mind per-
23. Editorial, Lawsuits Against Handguns, N.Y. limes, Nov. 14, 1998, at A12.
24. See Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 409.910 (West 1998 &
Supp.) (stripping defendants of all "affirmative defenses normally available," includ-
ing "assumption of risk").
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sonally was over $1 million or $2 million-"to take on an industry that
has never been taken on before, and then we are going to have a trial
team? Tobacco has never lost a case." I said, "Are you out of your
mind to call me and ask me?"
He said, "We want to bring this case in Palm Beach, Florida, and we
have this statute."
I said, "Let me talk about the statute just for a second. You've got a
legislature up there in Tallahassee that is owned by tobacco. But they
ought not to feel bad because the other forty-nine states are owned by
tobacco also, and they ought not to feel bad because Congress is
owned by tobacco. So you know what is going to happen to that damn
statute? It is going to get repealed. So we are going to go on for
about a year, a year and a half, spend all this money, the statute is
going to be repealed, and consequently I don't think-the Governor
may veto it, or he may trade it off for managed care or something." I
said, "Fred, thank you, but I'm going to take a bye on this one."
They couldn't put a team together, folks.
He called me back in another week or ten days and he said, "Let me
ask you something. I talked to Lawton the other day and he says he
really wants you to be the trial lawyer and lead counsel and he wants
to try this case in Palm Beach County because we have an excellent
judiciary down there, we have a wonderful Fourth District Court of
Appeals. Would you do us a favor?"
That is the reason I took this case. I spent $800,000 of my own
money.
Let me tell you the responsibility that goes along with being a trial
lawyer. I am an individual lawyer; I'm not a class action lawyer. I
have never handled a class action case in my life, don't want to. I am
a tragedy lawyer. I handle baby-brain-damage cases. I take on corpo-
rate America. And you talk about the man on the street. The man on
the street doesn't have a damn chance in that courtroom because they
will out-spend you.
RJR had a memorandum at a conference they had, and the law-
yer-it was Shook Hardy, I think it was-was asked, "How in the
world do you win these cases?" He said, "Let me tell you something.
I take a page out of Patton's book. It's not that we spend all of our
money; we make the other son-of-a-bitch spend all of theirs, and that's
how we win the lawsuits."
And that is how corporate America-I do not know if you have
ever been involved in heavy, heavy catastrophic litigation or know
anything about it. They paper you to death. They are the best lawyers
that money can buy.
The judges that have been appointed, especially in the federal court,
by the Republican Administration are very, very narrow. It is tough.
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I have a saying around my office: "If it was easy, everybody would be
doing it."
But let me tell you something. I turned this case down, but then we
got into it. The first thing that happened, of course, is we had ten
appeals. Five-hundred-million pieces of paper that tobacco went
through, because they went through every Medicaid fie-they had
legions of people in Tallahassee. They wanted to take a deposition of
every Medicaid patient, on which we ultimately had a hearing before
the Fourth District Court of Appeals. They then took it to the
Supreme Court of the State of Florida. By a four-to-three vote, the
statute was held constitutional.'
It went back to the Legislature. The first thing the Legislature did
was vote to repeal the statute.26 The statute was repealed. It went to
the Governor. The Governor vetoed it. 7 They had two lobbyists for
every legislator in the State of Florida, and it missed being repealed
and the veto overturned by one vote.
In the meantime, ladies and gentlemen, there were nine Florida law
firms and two out-of-state law firms that took on tobacco.
On July 21, 1997, I went up to Tallahassee to have a conference with
the Governor in order to prepare for his deposition. At that particu-
lar time, there was $6 billion on the table. Tobacco wanted to settle
for $6 billion. That is six thousand million dollars. A billion is a thou-
sand million dollars. There were six thousand million dollars on the
table.
I took the Governor in the back room and I said, "Governor, there
is a time for everything." We are rocking and rolling because we went
to focus groups down there. In our focus groups, Professor, we
couldn't win a damn thing. Why? Tobacco was a legal product. What
is the state doing trying to put a legal business out of business?
Number two, what's going to happen to the money? They get paid
more taxes than the Medicaid payments. The state is going to get the
money. Look at the lottery. It's supposed to be education. What did
they do? They fiddled it and fooled it away. We couldn't win
anything.
I want to tell you a true story of a focus group, Professor, because
you weren't there: Ladies and gentlemen, some of you don't like
Medicaid reimbursement because you say people shouldn't smoke,
and they know the dangers of it. Let me give you a hypothetical ques-
tion. You know that a mother who smokes is probably going to have a
baby whose weight is going to be underweight and is going to be sick,
and maybe the father has been an executive and lost their insurance
25. See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So.
2d 1239 (Fla. 1996), cerL denied, 520 U.S. 1115 (1997).
26. See Claudia MacLachlan, Recent Tobacco Rulings Give Both Sides the Jitters,
Nat'l L.J., June 12, 1995, at B1.
27. See id.
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and the baby doesn't have any insurance. Are you telling me that you
believe that that child should not receive medical care? Yeah, mother
shouldn't smoke. That is the kind of focus groups, Professor, that we
had.
Oh, it was a slam-dunk, all right. The only time that we began to
turn was when we began to get these deadly memorandums about
bringing children in, how they are going to get new smokers to take
the place of those that they kill, 400,000. I could go on and on and on,
but I don't want to because I want to stop at this point.
Let me tell you something. How in the hell, without the contin-
gency fee from all the persons that I have represented and been able
to put the money aside where I could take on insurance companies
that spend dollar-for-dollar-every damn dollar they spend, I spend
two dollars.
I took on Delta Air Lines and Flight 19128 and tragedies that I've
been involved in. The contingency fee allows me to take them on, and
I am delighted to do so. If you take away the contingency fee, you are
falling right in the hands of corporate America, the insurance compa-
nies. They don't give a damn about you, my friend; they give a damn
about the bottom line. And the only thing between catastrophe and
being a ward of the state is contingency fees for persons like Mike
Ciresi and all the nine trial lawyers that worked with me, and the two
outside law firms. That is the buffer. That is the protection that the
consumer has. I am proud of it. I am proud of that contingency fee.
If you ever take it away from me, you better duck, because you don't
have a chance.
Thank you.
PROF. CAPRA: The next speaker is Mike Ciresi.
MR. CIRESI: I find myself in an unusual position tonight, the voice
of reason. I am standing-I often say when I started trying lawsuits, I
was about 6'5", and it has been a long, long time.
Henry Simpson was a great patriot who served three of our presi-
dents, both Roosevelts and Harry Truman. A long time ago he said
this about the legal profession:
I came to understand and learn the noble history of the profession
of the law. I came to realize that without a bar trained in the condi-
tions of courage and loyalty, our constitutional theories of individ-
ual liberty would cease to be a reality. I learned of the experience
of many countries possessing constitutions and bills of rights similar
to our own whose citizens had nevertheless lost their liberties be-
cause they did not possess a bar with sufficient courage and inde-
28. Flight 191 was a Delta Airlines jet that crashed in Texas en route from Fort
Lauderdale to Los Angeles. See Robert D. McFadden, Jetliner With 161 Crashes in
Texas; At Least 122 Dead, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1985, at 1.
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pendence to establish those rights by a grave assertion of available
remedies. So I came to feel that the American lawyer should regard
herself or himself as a potential officer of her government and a
defender of its laws and constitution. I felt that if the time should
ever come when this tradition had faded out and the members of
the bar had become merely the servants of business, the future of
our liberties would be gloomy indeed. 29
I hear nothing in this debate about the fees of the defense bar. I do
not believe that every corporation sets out to injure and kill people;
99.9% of them do not. I have represented some of the great corpora-
tions of this country, and I am proud to have done so. I have also
represented injured victims.
I know in this case that this industry sold a product, which when
used as intended, kills. They knew it, and they knew it was addictive,
and they intentionally and deliberately went after children. In this
great city, the greatest city of our country, they sit on boards, they go
to their churches and synagogues, they are respected members of the
community, and every day they go to work. And eighty-two percent
of the people who start smoking are younger than the age of eight-
een-they do not dispute that-and sixty-seven percent are below the
age of sixteen. And every day they get them, and they knew by their
own documents that they intentionally went after them.
So I wondered, and I looked, and I said: "Isn't this an injustice?
Shouldn't we use available remedies and go after this industry?" We
did in Minnesota, and we did use available remedies. And they had
the most powerful law firms in the country representing them, good
law firms, outstanding lawyers. In our case, thirty law firms, 600 law-
yers, being paid every single day at $500 an hour, $550 an hour, $450
an hour, whatever. Every month their bills went out. They said in
court under oath that they spent over $100 million just producing the
privileged documents in our case. RJR said it spent over $95 million
producing its document index. Who did that money go to? In defend-
ing their right-and they have a right to have that type of defense.
That is our system, and to the fiber of my being I would fight for them
to have that right. But how are you going to take them on? Who is
going to take them on?
And so, fortunately, ladies and gentlemen, our liberties as a people
are intact because of the vigilance of the members of our legal profes-
sion. To be sure, these liberties are under constant and increased at-
tack by those who presume to possess ultimate truth and are
intolerant of those who disagree or who are different.
I suggest to you that we, together with all members of our society,
must join together, join arms, and restore, nurture, and enhance in-
29. Henry L. Stimson, Introduction to Henry L. Stimson & McGeorge Bundy, On
Active Service in Peace and War at xi, xxii (1947).
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formed public debate. I do not think it is necessary in this debate to
talk about "Junior Sultans of Brunei," to talk about "free money," to
talk about the "keys of Ali Baba's cave." What does that inform?
How does that help the debate? I do not know.
I do know this: over 400,000 lives are lost a year as a result of
smoking;30 one-sixth of the deaths in our country are caused by smok-
ing, greater than the combined deaths of alcohol, suicide, homicide,
AIDS, motor vehicles, cocaine, and heroin; I know that $50 billion in
health-care costs in this country are caused by smoking.
So we took them on and we looked at thirty-three million docu-
ments. The rest of the states asked for the Minnesota select docu-
ments. We had over 200 motions, seven appeals to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, or writs, two to the United States Supreme Court.
We fought for the privileged documents. We would not settle. We
stopped, together with others, the legislation that other states wanted
to pass in Congress because it emasculated the FDA, it gave immunity
to this industry, it prohibited people from joining together and bring-
ing suit. We are proud of that.
And we are proud of the fee. The Professor talks about $4000 an
hour. We didn't get $4000 an hour. Bob Montgomery has a seven-
person law firm. Fortunately, I am in a 220-person law firm. We did
not spend $800,000. We spent millions of dollars, tens of millions of
dollars, in time and out-of-pocket costs.
When we took on the case back in 1994, it was the subject of an
editorial in the Star Tribune saying that the basis upon which we took
the lawsuit was questionable.3' It was the subject of an article in The
Wall Street Journal.3" I do not recall any articles of Professor Brick-
man-or for that matter, anyone else-saying, "Hey, wait a minute.
These are slam-dunk lawsuits. These people shouldn't be on a
contingency."33
I didn't hear any legislature-and we were the second case to file.
Mississippi filed two months before us.34 They had one count of eq-
30. The American Cancer Society has estimated that smoking causes 419,000
deaths each year in the United States. See June Fletcher, Home Front: A Smoke-
Filled Room of One's Own, Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1998, at W1.
31. See Editorial, Tobacco Lies: Skip and the Blues Fight Fraud, Star Trib. (Min-
neapolis), Aug. 20, 1994, at 14A [hereinafter Tobacco Lies].
32. See Junda Woo, Cigarette Makers May Face Class Action on Addiction, Wall St.
J., Dec. 5, 1994, at B12.
33. Editor's note: Professor Brickman did author two articles in the Wall Street
Journal criticizing the contingency fee plan, however these did not appear until long
after 1994. See Lester Brickman, Want to Be a Billionaire? Sue a Tobacco Company,
Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1998, at All (contending that large attorneys' fees in tobacco
litigation is in fact decreasing the payout for the individual states suing the tobacco
companies); Brickman, supra note 18, at A18 (arguing that higher attorneys' fees lead
to more tort litigation and higher costs imposed on society).
34. See Milo Geyelin, Mississippi Becomes First State to Settle Suit Against Big
Tobacco Companies, Wall St. J., July 7, 1997, at B8.
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uity. We had antitrust, consumer product, undertaking of a special
responsibility; we had a number of counts. It was a much broader
case.
I didn't see one legislature, though, over all those years, never ever,
until they thought there was going to be a settlement. And most
states, keep in mind, jumped in late in the game. But I never saw one
legislature, except California, say, "Wait a minute. Let's appropriate
money for these lawsuits. Let's spend money on this. This is such a
good deal."
So I think we should discuss the fees. I have feelings about those
fees. Some may surprise you. But I think we ought to do it in an
informed way, because we can agree to disagree, but let's do it with-
out calling names and talk about what the real issues were in these
cases and truly how difficult they were.
Thank you very much.
PROF. CAPRA: Now I would like to turn to Barbara Gillers for a
professional responsibility perspective.
MS. GILLERS: I want to talk to you a little bit about the standards
that we apply in deciding whether fees are unethical, and then maybe
we can have that reasoned debate about whether these fees were
unethical.
There are essentially two rules that apply. One is New York Disci-
plinary Rule 2-106, which says that lawyer's fees shall not be "exces-
sive."35 The other is ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5,
which says that lawyer's fees shall be "reasonable. 36
It is very hard to give concrete meaning to those terms in a unique
circumstance, and I think, as you have heard tonight, this is a unique
circumstance. But you can make a reasoned and informed judgment
about what we mean by either "clearly excessive" or "reasonable" by
looking at the factors that the courts and the rules have identified as
bases on which to decide: (1) the novelty and difficulty of the issues as
they are presented when that the lawsuit is brought; (2) the extent to
which other work is preempted by the fact that the lawyers take on
the case involved; and (3) for contingent fees, the chance of success.
Now, I am ticking off these standards for you, but they are hard
standards to apply. I think we can all begin to see that you can have a
real debate about how these factors would apply in these
circumstances.
Also measured will be the time and labor involved in the case. You
have heard a lot about that.
35. See New York Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106 (1990).
36. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5 (1998).
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The courts apply these factors and find fees reasonable that on their
face, when you look at the number, might not look reasonable. I will
give you an example.
In the early 1970s, Telex Corporation won a large antitrust judg-
ment in the trial court.37 It was reversed by the Tenth Circuit,38 but an
adverse judgment was upheld, threatening Telex with bankruptcy.
Telex, as I am sure you all know, is a major corporation and the law-
suit was against IBM. Telex searched the country for a lawyer who
could handle this case and win it for them because that is what they
wanted to do.
They settled on Lasky. They said, in essence: "Will you do it?" He
said, "Sure I'll do it, but I will do it on a contingency because I don't
know whether and how far this case is going to go." They negotiated
an agreement that involved a contingency fee and a floor. Lasky said,
"I get a percentage of whatever you get," and then Lasky filed a certi-
orari petition with the Supreme Court.3 9
After the certiorari petition was filed, IBM came in and offered a
settlement, and the case was settled, I think, for what they called "a
wash," and Mr. Lasky sent a bill to Telex. His bill was for $1 million.
Telex said, "We're not paying $1 million. All you did was write a cer-
tiorari petition. That didn't take you very much time."
Well, there was a lawsuit, and the court held that this was not a
clearly excessive or unreasonable fee, that it was negotiated between
two sophisticated parties, and that it was enforceable.40
Well, how long does it take to file a certiorari petition? At 200
hours, the fee would have been $5000 per hour. It could have been
$10,000 or $20,000 an hour, if you calculate it all out. This is in early
1970s dollars, so you fast-forward to today and you see what kind of
money we are talking about. The court said that is not an unreasona-
ble fee.41
I dwell on that case for a moment as one in which the court will
look at the factors that I have articulated and some other factors and
make a judgment, under the circumstances, whether the fee that is
charged and being collected is actually unreasonable or clearly exces-
sive within the meaning of the Lawyers' Code of Ethics.
I want to pause for one more minute and ask the question: Why do
we allow contingency fee cases? Well, you have heard some of the
reasons here, and they are substantiated throughout the profession.
There are people who cannot afford to pay lawyers, there are indus-
37. See Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd, 510 F.2d
894 (10th Cir. 1975).
38. See Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
39. See Telex Corp. v. IBM, 423 U.S. 802 (1975) (dismissal of certiorari).
40. See Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866, 875 (9th Cir.
1979).
41. See id.
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tries that will not be taken on, there are cases that will not be brought,
unless we allow contingency fees.
The contingency fees can be judged by the factors that I have given
you. They are not measured by hourly rates, nor should they be.
They are a variation of what has long been called "value billing"; that
is, you get in a sense what you pay for, and a contingency is a variation
of that. It does not correspond to any particular hourly rate.
There is one final point that I wanted to raise to give some addi-
tional background. A major New Jersey law firm that brought one of
the tobacco cases, and in 1993-94 they moved in front of the Federal
District Court in New Jersey and said, "Let us out of this case. We
can't afford it any more." They went through some of the things that
you have heard tonight about the number of depositions that were
taken, the number of appeals that were taken, the amount of money
that it cost this firm. The District Court in New Jersey would not let
the law firm out of that case. Why wouldn't it let the law firm out of
that case? Because no one else would do it and the plaintiff needed
the lawyer to continue.
In these cases there were significant risks, there was a real down
side to the lawyers, and there is a real history which shows that these
cases were not always slam-dunks and that lawyers were not always
beating down the door for them at the time.
Just one more thing I want to tell you. Under the ethics rules, con-
tingency fee arrangements are judged at the time that they are made,
not in hindsight. So if you can say that the agreement was reasonable
under the factors that I have articulated at the time that it was made,
it does not then become unreasonable at the end of the day when the
fees are very high. We can all debate about whether fees ought to be
the number that they are, whether the money ought to go somewhere
else. There are lots of good policy arguments to be made. But in
terms of the ethics rule, the agreement is looked at at the time that the
agreement is made.
PROF. CAPRA: Thank you, Barbara.
I would like to ask Professor Brickman two questions. One ques-
tion is on your public funding issue. How do you respond to the argu-
ment that there weren't any legislatures that were willing to fund the
litigation against tobacco?
The second question is to ask, in light of whatever response you
want to make, what about the idea that the contracts between the law-
yers and the states, or the contracts between, as Barbara referred to,
sophisticated business people who knew what they were doing, how
can you at the end of the day call that excessive?
PROF. BRICKMAN: Let me take the second issue first. The sugges-
tion that because a state attorney general or a governor or a gover-
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nor's representative is a lawyer, and indeed a public official, they are
also a sophisticated user of a contingency fee service, I think is really
amiss. Most of the state attorneys general had never before negoti-
ated contingency fee contracts. This was certainly sui generis. I sug-
gested that there were issues regarding the risk that the attorneys
general were simply unaware of. The lawyers who began this process
knew a good deal more than the people with whom they were
negotiating.
I also suggest that there is a fiduciary responsibility when you are
representing a state that is in addition to the kinds of responsibilities
when you take on an individual client.
With regard to the ultimate question, which I addressed and you
now raise again, if the legislature will not do it and it's a good idea,
why not let the litigation system run it? And, of course, what we
mean by the litigation system, by and large, at that point is the contin-
gency fee system.
Well, I am suggesting that-not because of any like for tobacco, but
simply as a matter of whether the end justifies the means-I think that
in a democracy, in a republican form of government, you simply have
to do what it takes to get the legislature to go your way. I think that is
not out of the question. I certainly concede-it is not even a conces-
sion, it's a reality-that big tobacco owned many of the legislatures.
But, you know, in Florida in days gone by, the Legislature was owned
by people in small counties where the cows exceeded the residents.
There are changes that need to be made, but I do not think the way to
do it is to subvert the form of government we have, which is what I
think has occurred here.
MR. MONTGOMERY: You talked about the legislature. Our stat-
ute that was passed, that gave us the right to sue tobacco-which was
not new, by the way-if a third party, if somebody runs a stop sign or
hurts someone that goes into Medicaid, from dollar one you have to
pay Medicaid back.42 That statute said we were entitled to thirty per-
cent, passed by the legislature.
How do you explain the Federal Employers' Liability Act,43 which
provides for contingency fees for lawyers? 44 How do you explain the
Federal Tort Claims Act,45 which provides that a maximum of twenty-
five percent of recovery can be awarded as attorneys' fees? 46 Con-
gress passed that law and it never has been fiddled with. When I sue
42. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 16.53 (West 1998).
43. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
44. Editor's note: The Act does not explicitly provide for contingency fees for
lawyers. However, such fee arrangements are generally used in cases brought under
the Act. See Thomas E. Baker, Why Congress Should Repeal the Federal Employer's
Liability Act of 1908, 29 Harv. J. on Legis. 79, 107 (1992).
45. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1994).
46. See id. § 2678.
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the government on a baby-brain-damage case, the attorneys' fee is ap-
proved just like that. How do you explain the twenty-five percent
under those circumstances when lawyers when they are sworn in do
not take a vow of poverty, Professor?
PROF. BRICKMAN: Because those statutory examples of contin-
gency fee-setting by the legislature involve individual litigations, they
involve representing a tort claim in a traditional manner. These are
sui generis representations, and the experience within the tort system
does not extend over to what is a wholly different kind of-we will call
it litigation, because in some sense it was, but I am suggesting it was
something other than litigation as well.
The rules of ethics themselves really do not have a purchase on
these kinds of fee arrangements. This kind of an action was simply
not contemplated by the drafters of the rules. This truly is sti generis.
MR. MONTGOMERY: Not so. Our statute in Florida itself passed
to the extent that we could have market share, to the extent that the
attorneys would be entitled to thirty percent.47 Now, how do you ex-
plain that? How do you explain that this is unethical?
How do you explain that when you are dealing with a sophisticated
chief legal officer of the state who runs an office with a hundred law-
yers, the governor of the state, the attorneys general throughout the
other states that made these? How do you explain that, Professor?
That it's just not right? Is that what you are saying? That's no answer.
PROF. BRICKMAN: Well, you know the judge in Palm Beach
County said it wasn't right.'
MR. MONTGOMERY: Yes, and he was reversed. The Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeals said he didn't know what he was talking
about.49 They had had no hearing whatsoever. So let's not mislead
these folks here.
PROF. BRICKMAN: He was reversed on the grounds that that was
not the issue before him, not on the basis of reasonableness. I will
grant you I was not there. I was quoting Fred Levin, as you did, and
he was there, and he was the one who said, "This is a slam-dunk."
MR. MONTGOMERY: Fred Levin had nothing to do wvith the trial
in this case, and you know that as well as I do.
47. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 16.53.
48. See State v. American Tobacco Co., No. CL95-1466 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 21,
1997), rev'd on other grounds sub. nora. Kerrigan, Estess, Rankin & McLeod v. State,
No. 97-4008, 1998 WL 246325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 18, 1998).
49. See Kerrigan, Estess, Rankin & McLeod v. State, No. 97-4008, 1998 WL
246325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 18, 1998).
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PROF. CAPRA: Maybe Mike would like to comment.
MR. CIRESI: Let me address a couple of the points that were raised.
I think Barbara has put the issue in context.
Let's deal first with an assertion you made that the chief legal of-
ficer of a state is an incompetent, essentially.
PROF. CAPRA: I am not sure he meant it exactly that way.
MR. CIRESI: But that is basically what he said, that they do not have
any experience in these contingent fee contracts and they really did
not know what they were doing.
Well, the chief legal officer of the State of Minnesota has a staff of
220 lawyers. The Attorney General's office had a history-not just
with Attorney General Humphrey, but with both Republican and
Democratic attorneys general previous to him-of entering into con-
tingent fee contracts with lawyers. So they had experience in that.
The case law in Minnesota provided for contingent fee contracts when
a lawyer represented a government entity.
So I think it is a rather-and I don't mean to use this in the pejora-
tive sense, but it sort of comes sometimes with academia-it is sort of
an arrogant assumption to suggest that these attorneys general did not
have the legal maturity or judgment to enter into these contracts.
In Minnesota, our contract was filed with the Secretary of State in
1994.50 It was the subject, as I said, of an editorial in the Star Tribune,
which laid it out.51 Every legislator knew about it. In fact, what the
legislators were saying then was, "I'm sure glad Humphrey took this
one on contingency." So it wasn't as if people did not know what was
going on.
You talk about whether the fees were unreasonable or not and
boards of professional responsibility. I had, as a result of this suit, the
first ethics complaint ever filed against me in my twenty-eight years as
a lawyer. It was filed by two Republicans. They solicited a lawsuit on
the floor of the Republican Convention in Minnesota, literally, and
this was a party that had a platform against the institution of frivolous
lawsuits. So they filed an ethics complaint against the firm.
The Board of Professional Responsibility in Minnesota said, "You
can't file it against a firm, so we'll just name Ciresi." So they inserted
my name in. They then dismissed it. I would suggest you read that,
Professor, because they addressed some of the issues that you are rais-
ing. They dismissed it summarily. There was then an appeal from that
to the Board as a whole, and that was also dismissed.
The lawsuit that was brought by those individuals-and they did
this during the gubernatorial race-was dismissed by the judge, who
50. See Tobacco Lies, supra note 31.
51. See id.
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said that it was frivolous, without merit under any theory of the law,
and he awarded sanctions against them for bringing the lawsuit.
So I think you have to take a look at two issues here. One is, did
the attorneys general have the authority in a given state to enter into
these contracts? And then, in each individual state, take a look at the
fees and what was done and say, "Are those reasonable or not?"
rather than making blanket statements, such as you make, about the
attorneys general of the United States.
PROF. CAPRA: Let me ask you this, Mike. In that respect, in your
view of what has been going on, especially with what will still be going
on, is there some unreasonableness out there? Are lawyers asking for
too much?
MR. CIRESI: Well, of course some will ask for too much, and some
did. I am not arguing that point.
PROF. BRICKMAN: They got it.
MR. CIRESI: Just a minute. What we did is we did a simple thing:
we tore up our contract with the state and we negotiated with these
lawyers for the industry. Now, you are wrong when you say it is all
part of a pot-well, in a way you are wrong and in a way you are not.
The fact is the State of Minnesota got much more than their damages,
much more than we put into evidence. It was only after that that we
negotiated attorneys' fees directly with the lawyers who were repre-
senting the industry. So that was an arm's-length transaction, okay?
And these fees were known by everyone.
Now, we put in a tremendous amount of time. We were one firm.
The only state in the Union that had one law firm representing it was
Minnesota. We felt that we shouldn't get $1.5 billion. I will be glad to
take it from the state if they want to give it to us, but we felt that was
too much in light of the result and in light of everything else.
Although we were entitled to it by contract, and we were, we decided
not to do that.
What we said was, "You can judge what we have done. It is out
there in the public record. Here are our fees. If somebody else did
more than us, God bless them, they can get more; but if they did less,
they ought to get less." Now, I think there are a lot of lawyers out
there who did some very good work. There are some who didn't do
squat, so they shouldn't get anything. But judge it on a state-by-state
and case-by-case basis.
As a result of our settlement, which was two times per capita what
they got in Texas or Florida, twenty percent more than they got in
Mississippi, they put in most-favored-nation clauses, which gave us-
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MR. MONTGOMERY: $1.7 billion because of the actions of Mike in
Minnesota, under what I call the "mighty fine nation clause."
MR. CIRESI: You're right, the most-favored-nation clause. Florida
got $1.7 billion, Texas got another $2.2 billion, and Mississippi got an-
other $600 million.52 I didn't ask for any attorneys' fees from those
states, but if they want to give us some, that's fine. I don't suggest
anybody is going to appropriate any in those legislatures.
But the fact is we must look, I think, at each and every individual
state and say, "What was done by the lawyers?" Let them stand up
and say what they did and let it be judged, rather than making blanket
statements, such as you have been wont to make, Professor, both in
your writings and in your statements here today. I think then, and
only then, can you judge it against the criteria that Barbara has set
forth, because those are the correct criteria to judge these issues.
MR. MONTGOMERY: Let me just make one other observation very
quickly.
PROF. CAPRA: Very quickly, and then let's go to Barbara and let
her respond.
MR. MONTGOMERY: Not one time during the whole course did
tobacco nor the State of Florida ever come to me or any member of
the team and say, "Let's negotiate this fee. This is twenty-five percent
under your contract, a deal's a deal, blah, blah, but let's sit down as
reasonable people and let's negotiate this fee." It never happened.
Tobacco in its arrogance, and the state in its arrogance, said, "You
shall go to arbitration. If you want any money, fine." The Supreme
Court of the State of Florida said, "You have a tight contract, great
contract. Sue the state, get a judgment, and go have the legislature
appropriate the money," which would never, never happen.
So no negotiations whatsoever. They threw the gauntlet down and
went to arbitration and got twenty-six percent, as opposed to twenty-
five percent under that contract, and I am happy to take my share of
it.
PROF. CAPRA: Barbara?
MS. GILLERS: I want to say two things in response to some of the
things that have been said.
The first is I feel very close to academics, Professor Brickman, but I
did want to put in an independent plug for government lawyers. Hav-
ing served in the Justice Department and litigated both for and against
52. See Scott Gold, State, Tobacco Negotiating $1.7 Billion Settlement Boost, Sun
Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale), July 20, 1998, at lB.
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the government, I think that there are many very sophisticated law-
yers in government who are as able as any general counsel or big-firm
lawyer to negotiate a contract. So I disagree with you insofar as you
say that the government lawyers were not in the position to negotiate
these contracts.
Forgive me, but I want to make one other point, which is unrelated
to that but arises out of some of the discussion, and that is that one of
the impetuses for the contingency fee arrangements is that the lawyers
were able to serve as private attorneys general and serve the public
interest. And so, while I do not think that it is incumbent upon law-
yers because of the ethics rules to do what I am going to suggest, I
think that it is part of the lawyers' public purpose, a sort of moral
calling for lawyers, or a professional calling, to give back something in
appropriate cases if the fees are too high. I don't say they need to or
they have to or that the ethics rules require it, but that is a matter of
good judgment, that it may be that some lawyers want to.
I know, Mike, you have in fact given back some of these fees to
charitable organizations, to health care for kids and to serve other
kinds of public purposes.
PROF. CAPRA: Lester?
PROF. BRICKMAN: First, my comments regarding the degree of so-
phistication and judgment of states' attorneys general is based on hav-
ing read most of the contingency fee contracts and other kinds of
contracts that were entered into, and in many cases they were any-
thing but sophisticated.
MR. CIRESI: Which ones did you read?
PROF. BRICKMAN: I read about thirty-five, as I recall. I read
yours too, and your comment about the $4000 an hour thing is utterly
wrong. I won't use other words. And I think the fee statement that
was filed in Minnesota, with the add-ons, which were just a top-down
kind of a public policy ploy, simply didn't become you. I don't see
why you just didn't put the fee out there and say "that's the fee,"
instead of trying to justify it mathematically with numbers that were
obviously concocted.
MR. CIRESI: What numbers were concocted? Why do you make
these statements?
PROF. BRICKMAN: I read your-
MR. CIRESI: What number was concocted? Tell me what number
was concocted. That is fiat-out false.
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PROF. BRICKMAN: The numbers were simply concocted as a way
of getting to a certain number.
MR. CIRESI: No, they weren't.
PROF. BRICKMAN: Yes, they were, and it was reported in the press
that way.53
MR. CIRESI: Who reported it in the press? Wait a minute. You
made a statement. You said things were concocted and you said they
were false and you have no basis for that.
PROF. BRICKMAN: Well, I read--
MR. CIRESI: Just a minute. The industry negotiated that. Do you
think they wanted those in there to use maybe as a standard against
what others may get or may not get?
PROF. BRICKMAN: You negotiated a number and you concocted a
formula to justify the number.
MR. CIRESI: That is flat-out false, sir. Were you there?
PROF. BRICKMAN: I was in Florida.
MR. CIRESI: So you were not there, correct?
PROF. BRICKMAN: I was not there.
MR. CIRESI: Did you talk to anyone who participated in those nego-
tiations who told you that?
PROF. BRICKMAN: I read your--
MR. CIRESI: Did you talk to anyone who participated in those nego-
tiations who told you that?
PROF. BRICKMAN: Let me continue.
MR. CIRESI: You didn't, did you? So don't just make assertions,
okay?
PROF. BRICKMAN: With regard to the states' attorneys general,
given the amounts of money at stake, it was inevitable that in many of
the states the selection process would be, let me call it, tainted by the
volume of money that was going to be passing through. In Texas, for
53. See Pete Aronson, Sealed Fee Pacts Raise Questions: Expert Calls Agreement in
Minnesota Tobacco Case "Hocus Pocus", N.Y. L.J., Sept. 14, 1998, at A6.
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example, one of the major attorneys in Texas who as not a part of the
"Dream Team," stated publicly that the State Attorney General de-
manded a million dollars from him and from any attorney who would
become the State's private attorney, and he refused.
Secrecy surrounded the hiring of the lawyers in most of the states by
the attorneys general. In most states, the hiring was done on a pay-to-
play basis.
MR. MONTGOMERY: Didn't you hear me say I turned this case
down twice, Professor? Twice I had been begged by the Governor to
take this case in the first place, and they had me up before-I went to
Senator Criss up there in Tallahassee. The most damn foolish thing I
ever heard in my life, talking about being tainted. Nobody wanted
this case. Look at the people who turned it down, for God's sake.
PROF. BRICKMAN: Why did the Governor just absolutely rip up
your contract?
MR. CIRESI: Professor, let's discuss the merits of this. You said
"pay-to-play." What did you mean, and who are you asserting was a
"pay-to-play?" I take that as an insult to all the lawyers who are out
there. If you have specific facts relating to an individual, you ought to
state that and not make blanket statements indicting all kinds of law-
yers who did-
PROF. BRICKMAN: I am not.
MR. CIRESI: Well, you did, sir.
PROF. BRICKMAN: I am making blanket statements that many of
the lawyers were selected on the basis of the campaign contributions
that they made to the state attorneys general.
MR. CIRESI: Tell me who.
PROF. BRICKMAN: Give me the list of the lawyers that was pub-
lished as part of the settlement agreement, the specific list that is listed
in the agreement that says, "The following lawyers are going to re-
ceive moneys under this settlement."
MR. CIRESI: What are you talking about? Which settlement?
PROF. BRICKMAN: The $206 billion settlement with the states.-4
PROF. CAPRA: That's the kind of assertion that I don't think we can
litigate here, so I think we should probably move on.
54. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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MR. CIRESI: Right. And what we should talk about are the facts
and any that the Professor has, because that is informed public debate.
Let's talk about individual states where the Professor feels he has
some information, other than now mentioning a $206 billion settle-
ment. That was the forty-six states, I take it, you're talking about.
PROF. BRICKMAN: Yes.
MR. CIRESI: We had nothing to do with that.
MR. MONTGOMERY: When Lawton Chiles was running for Gov-
ernor, $100 was the maximum you could give him. I don't know
whether I even gave him $100 or not. I may have, though. So if $100
buys him, he sure was a cheap politician, I'll tell you that.
PROF. CAPRA: In light of that, I would like to open it up for audi-
ence comment.
MR. GEFFEN:55 I have a question for the lawyers: when you are
faced with settlement offers where you have these contingent fee ar-
rangements, is there absolutely no force that kind of pulls you into
accepting this offer of settlement, especially in light of all the effort
you have put into it and the enormous figures, the multibillion-dollar
figures? Can you tell me that there is absolutely no force that in some
small matter pulls you a little bit more toward accepting the offer?
What do you do to fight that? I mean, what is it that prepares you?
How can you set your mind so that you kind of ignore that force?
MR. CIRESI: Number one, what guides you, what has to guide you
under the Rules of Professional Responsibility and the honor of the
profession, is your client's best interests. Now, some people snick-
ered. I don't find that funny.
In June of 1997, all the states wanted to settle. Minnesota would
have gotten $4.1 billion. We would have gotten a lot of money. This
was in April, and I called Skip Humphrey out to Tyson's Corner
where the discussions were going on. I said, "We're not going to do
this." He said, "I agree, Mike," and he stood against all the attorneys
general who he had worked with for over sixteen years, and he stood
alone, because he always told me from the outset of that case, "This
will be judged by its legal merits, not political considerations."
The settlement emasculated the FDA, it curtailed individual peo-
ple's rights, it granted immunity to the industry, and the documents
were not going to come out. And so, we went back and we said "no,"
and we went forward. For the first time, the Governor of Minnesota
came out and said, "Take the $4.1 billion. These attorneys are going
55. William Geffen, J.D. Candidate, 2001, Fordham University School of Law.
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to make billions." And Skip Humphrey said "no," and we said "no,"
and we tried our case, the only state that did try the case as long as we
did. Bob's was the only other state where they even picked a jury.
And so we went through four months, and we fought for the privi-
leged documents, which we finally received in April. It was on the day
that I was going to give my closing argument when the case settled,
and the client got $6.1 billion. That's over twenty-five years. It can be
more. It can be less. But all the other factors-all the injunctive re-
lief, all the non-economic relief-a settlement that Surgeon General
Koop said was "one of the most significant health developments of the
second half of the twentieth century." That's what he said about our
settlement.
So what do you do? You act in the client's best interest. And if you
lose your ass, that's the deal that you took at the beginning. If you
can't do that as a lawyer, if you don't have the strength and the will
and the courage to do that as a contingent fee lawyer, don't do it. Do
lawyers abuse that? Yes, they do. And when they do-
MR. MONTGOMERY: Let me just comment on that. That is a
super good question. All I can tell you is you have to do it by reputa-
tion. You know, sometimes you have to sit down with a client, and
you have to sit down early in the game, and say, "Look, Ms. Jones,
they are going to offer you as time goes by five or six million dollars,
and I'm going to tell you now you and your husband think about that,
because that's not enough money to take care of that child. Until such
time as they get to seven-and-a-half, eight, nine million dollars-what
I call the red zone-that's the time to talk." But I have to tell my
clients to steel themselves from taking that.
And then, we have what we call a forty-thirty-twenty contingency
fee contract approved by the Supreme Court. So you can see that the
pressure gets really rough, because on the back end of it-forty per-
cent of the first million, thirty percent of the second million, and
twenty percent of everything thereafter, unless a larger fee is ap-
proved by the court. So, consequently, the attorneys' fees go down as
you get more and more money.
But you have to do it by reputation. I think Mike put it correctly.
You have to think about your client and you have to be true to your-
self. Otherwise, you are a thief, and if you are going to be in the law
for that purpose, then you are in the wrong business.
QUESTIONER: You said that in your case you acted admirably in
that client's best interest. But I'm saying, as a general rule, how do
lawyers as a profession stand up against that kind of thing?
MR. CIRESI: Very, very well, just as I believe that the profession as a
whole on the defense side, which charges by the hour, 99.9% of the
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lawyers are honorable. They don't over-bill, they don't pad their
hours. Some will. Some will delay it, some will do unnecessary things.
We are human beings, so you are going to have that. But the system
works very well.
You know what the real key to that is? This American system of
ours is the only system of jurisprudence like this in the world. I have
spoken all over the world, and I see people from England, Australia,
Korea, and Japan. They want to come here to get justice.
Now, the Professor will say that they want to come here to get the
pot at the end of the rainbow. Not true. They can't even bring cases
in other places. And now in England they are going toward a contin-
gency fee system, and it is because the system does work.
Is it abused? Yes, there are occasions where it is, on both the plain-
tiff and defense side, and the full force of this profession ought to
come down on either side when that happens.
MR. MONTGOMERY: A lot of people say that what we do is a lot-
tery. Let me tell you something, folks. I've got some cases where you
wouldn't want a ticket to that lottery. I can tell you that right now.
PROF. CAPRA: Professor Gillers.
PROF. GILLERS: 6 I'd like to ask the Professor a question because I
know he thrives on adversity.
But first, up until the moment that this settled, how much lawyer
time in dollars and firm-dollar disbursements had you invested in that
case, roughly?
MR. CIRESI: Between $30 and $40 million. That's what I'll tell you.
PROF. GILLERS: Is that the gross number?
MR. CIRESI: Yes.
PROF. GILLERS: Okay.
MR. CIRESI: That's attorneys' time and out-of-pocket costs.
QUESTIONER: Okay. So, Lester, here is my question. I hear two
issues being debated here. One is whether in a particular situation the
amount of a fee is unreasonable, and that can be analyzed in various
ways.
But the second issue is what I want to talk about, and that is
whether the lawyers behaved unethically. We can all agree that a fee
could turn out to be unreasonable although everybody acted properly.
56. Stephen M. Gillers, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
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So my question is: If Mr. Ciresi's case had gone to the jury, and if the
jury came in with a defense verdict and he was out $30 or $40 million,
at that point would he have acted unethically, or did he act unethically
only because his work produced the great success of the settlement he
was able to achieve?
MR. CIRESI: That's a tough one, but thank you, Professor.
PROF. BRICKMAN: Let me respond to your first point. I will agree
with you that the reasonableness of the fees is something that we have
not addressed at all. Apart from my original remarks, those have not
been addressed at all.
Second, with regard to whether the fee agreement was ethical at the
time that it was entered into, you have a multiplicity of fee agree-
ments. And so, I think, I can't answer that in a broad scope. I deal on
a case-by-case basis.
Starting off with Mississippi, with Richard Scruggs, who began the
ball rolling in terms of litigation, I think that was perhaps the most
significant risk being taken of any of the lawyers because that was
early on in the process.
MR. CIRESI: Because he was two months before us? If I had known
that, I would have filed before him, and then you would have been
agreeing with me.
PROF. BRICKMAN: I actually think that your fees, simply by a mat-
ter of measure, are some of the least unreasonable of the entire set of
fees.
MR. CIRESI: That's called damning with faint praise.
PROF. BRICKMAN: What I was really going to do was apologize
before for calling you a "Junior Sultan of Brunei." I'll take out the
"junior."
PROF. CAPRA: Now, now. Why don't we answer Professor Gilder's
question?
PROF. BRICKMAN: I think that in the cases even early on, where
there were twenty-five percent contingency fees, they were probably
unreasonable, given the fact that the lawyers did know so much more
than the state attorneys general about what was going on, because this
was not just a state-by-state effort. This was a coordinated effort; this
was a political process that was going on, using the courts as a tool to
compel the tobacco industry to settle, coupled with the fact that in the
tobacco industry the CEOs had changed. The new CEOs who came
on-board were people who had capital markets in mind, they were
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looking at the stock price, and they realized that in order to get the
shareholders' stock price up in the languishing tobacco stocks, they
had to bring some kind of closure.
So the confluence, I think, created an enormous opportunity for the
lawyers, and I think that certainly many of them, including Mr. Ciresi,
deserve a substantial fee. The question is, what is that?
PROF. GILLERS: But you are not answering my question, Lester.
The day that Mr. Ciresi signed his fee contract, which may have been
before or after Mississippi lawyers did, on that day, given that contract
which you have read, do you now have any reason-knowing that on
that date he could not know whether he would lose or how much he
might win, if anything-do you have any reason for saying that on that
day that contract violated Mr. Ciresi's ethical obligations as a licensed
lawyer of Minnesota?
PROF. BRICKMAN: I don't think so. I don't think so in Mr. Ciresi's
case, although the fact that he traded in his twenty-five percent fee,
which was payable to them over-what, twenty-five years-
MR. CIRESI: That's not true. And there's another problem here.
PROF. BRICKMAN: Let me just-
MR. CIRESI: Professor, please-
PROF. BRICKMAN: You traded in your contingency fee, which was
payable over the period of time over which the income would be com-
ing in from the tobacco companies-
MR. CIRESI: Well, that's another thing that is not true. You haven't
answered the Professor's question.
PROF. BRICKMAN: -in exchange for a present value fee, I think,
payable over two and a half years.
MR. CIRESI: What you have done is say "yes, but." Now let's talk-
since we're on Minnesota, I know something about Minnesota, and I
don't want to speak for other states unless I know something about
them.
But you said there was a political process going on. How many suits
were filed in 1994?
PROF. BRICKMAN: I believe one.
MR. CIRESI: One? You're wrong already.
How many were fied in 1995? How many states were in suit?
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PROF. BRICKMAN: I can tell you by looking at the affidavit I filed
in one of the state cases,57 but I don't recall the numbers offhand.
MR. CIRESI: More than ten?
PROF. BRICKMAN: When?
MR. CIRESI: 1995.
PROF. BRICKMAN: No. I think less than ten.
MR. CIRESI: There were two in 1994.
PARTICIPANT: There were four.
MR. CIRESI: Just a minute. Mississippi and then Minnesota.
PARTICIPANT: West Virginia.
MR. CIRESI: West Virginia was fied in, I believe, early 1995, wasn't
it?
PARTICIPANT: 1994.
MR. MONTGOMERY: Not suited.
MR. CIRESI: It was non-suited, okay.
How many states came in 1995? You don't know.
PROF. BRICKMAN: I don't recall. I do know, but I don't recall.
MR. CIRESI: How many in 1996? You said there was a political
process.
PROF. BRICKMAN: The bulk of them came in-
MR. CIRESI: You see, that is the problem. You have made a state-
ment here to these folks that at the time we filed suit-Mississippi,
Minnesota-that there was a political process going on where all these
state suits were being filed. It is not true.
PROF. BRICKMAN: There was a political process going on, in that
the attorneys who were behind the litigation understood that the way
to succeed was to get as many attorneys general as possible to bring
cases.
MR. CIRESI: What attorneys? Who are you talking about?
57. See Texas v. American Tobacco Co., No. 5:96-CV-91 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 1998)
(affidavit of Lester Brickman).
1999] 2855
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
PROF. BRICKMAN: I am talking about Scruggs, Rice, Motley, and
Umphrey. Those are the main ones.
PROF. CAPRA: Let's turn to any other questions from the audience.
Professor Zipursky?
PROF. ZIPURSKY:5 8 I don't want to challenge the deservedness of
the attorneys in the tobacco litigation, which was incredibly successful
litigation that I think many people feel has great public benefits, and I
don't want to challenge the quantity at all. All I want to ask is a gen-
eral question-and it has only been mentioned once, I think-which is
whether there is any reason to doubt that contingency fees gener-
ally-not in the tobacco litigation, but in the kind of litigation that we
are now seeing in hand guns and tobacco-but contingency fees gen-
erally for what we might call public-health-tort litigation carry with
them the sort of risks that, let's say, we see in criminal cases. I mean,
there are categories of cases where we want the attorneys to have a
special eye towards their responsibilities and the public good. The
question is whether, in light of that, and in light of the fact that the
state is not poor and could put up money up-front, we ought not have
contingency fee arrangements for these kinds of cases?
PROF. CAPRA: Anyone want to take that?
MR. MONTGOMERY: It doesn't make any difference. I am sure
Mike's answer would be the same. They couldn't get any money. The
state in our contract set forth the fact that the state could not handle
this litigation. The legislature would not appropriate any money. As I
mentioned, the legislature, in Florida at least, is owned by the tobacco
companies, the lobbyists are so powerful there. They aren't going to
appropriate any money to sue.
The gun industry-as I say, I am not a class action lawyer-I have
one case and that's it. I don't know what is going to happen there. I
can't answer your question. I have no thoughts on that at all, one way
or the other.
But I can tell you one thing so far as this tobacco litigation is con-
cerned. The state could, number one, never have taken it on. The
second thing is had they taken it on, then consequently the legislature
would have put them out of business because they would not have
appropriated any money. I will say this, insofar as what Professor
Brickman said, they didn't have-I won't say talent-I'll say the back-
ground and the experience to handle a case of this magnitude. They
just didn't have the personnel to handle that. Consequently, that is
the best answer I can give.
58. Benjamin Zipursky, Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
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MR. CIRESI: Professor, you are talking about on a going-forward
basis, as I understand your question. I'll tell you my bias, and that is
that I would let the market work. These contracts, at least in our
state, are public. The Attorney General is an elected official. I think
if you are going to get the best lawyers to handle them, you'd better
let the marketplace work. I don't know why you would want to fetter
the state by restricting the availability of lawyers who they may be
able to obtain to handle a very, very difficult case where the state
doesn't have the resources.
Might there be abuses in that? If there are, I think in individual
states you could handle it through the individual state process, as op-
posed to saying, "Let's have a legislation out there that says this."
You are going to give a lot of people a blank check to do a lot of
things.
PROF. BRICKMAN: Let me finish the response.
As you indicate, with the proliferation of suits now ongoing by
states represented by contingency fee lawyers, or effectively the same
kinds of suits as class actions, which are the precursors to state suits, as
in the gun area, you have the policy issue I posed earlier, of whether
conjoining the private-gain motive with public policymaking in this
form is an acceptable process, if you think that the outcomes that you
seek are only obtainable that way and cannot be obtained through the
legislative process.
PROF. CAPRA: But is that any different from, for example, civil
rights actions which have attorneys' fees awards? There is always go-
ing to be a profit motive for lawyers to do public policy.
PROF. BRICKMAN: Absolutely. But this is vastly different, I think,
when you are talking about taking on an industry and in effect trying
to outlaw it, not by the legislative route, but by litigation. I think that
is a vastly different circumstance, and I think it raises the kind of pub-
lic policy issues that deserve a great deal of airing. These are being
sublimated in the face of billions of dollars, which just overwhelm the
issue.
MR. CIRESI: I don't think the second part of your answer was
accurate.
What is the public policy issue, assuming that you are enforcing the
laws of the state? In other words, the law has already acted from a
public policy statement and says that there is a viable cause of action
here.
Now, if you are saying the public policy is whether the state can hire
a private lawyer as an adjunct to the attorney general's staff, that is
another issue of public policy. In Minnesota, the legislature has spo-
ken on that issue: you can. I believe in the other states that there is
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probably similar legislation. I don't know, but I can speak for Minne-
sota in that regard. So I'm not sure what your public policy issue is,
Professor.
PROF. CAPRA: I think we have time for one more question.
MS. ETHAN: My name is Linda Ethan. In the interest of fairness on
the question, I would like to tell you that I am the Deputy Attorney
General for Litigation from Texas, and, as you know, we are investi-
gating attorneys' fees.
The question I have is, would you comment on the ethics of the
Texas lawyers who were awarded $3.3 billion in arbitration who are
under the standstill agreement that was signed this last summer, stand-
still litigation with the Governor? In that litigation, they agreed that
they would tell the State of Texas by early January whether or not
they would take the arbitration fee or they would rely on the contin-
gency contracts. The contingency fee contract would give them $2.3
billion, arbitration $3.3 billion, paid out at a different time, of course.
They have refused to tell the state whether they are going to take
arbitration or rely on the contingency fee contract, at least at this
point. I would like comments on the ethics of not telling the client at
this point what the lawyers want to do in that fee award.
MR. CIRESI: Assuming your stated facts to be true-and I know
there are a lot of political shenanigans going on down in Texas in the
new Attorney General's office, so I don't know about any of that-
but just assuming the facts as you posited, they should tell them. I
think they have a duty to tell the state. That is my feeling.
MR. MONTGOMERY: I agree. For example, when Florida settled, I
was one of the lawyers as lead counsel that was dead set against settle-
ment. We had been picking a jury for three weeks. As Shelly Schles-
inger said, we were rocking and rolling. We told the Governor that.
But you have to follow the dictates of your client. We could never
stand in the way of any settlement. But you have to make a full, fair
disclosure to your client and always put-as Mike said previously,
your client as number one. So I agree with you, based upon your
hypothetical. If your hypothetical has basis in fact, then consequently
of course they should tell them.
PROF. CAPRA: I'd like to thank you all for coming and thank our
panelists. Thank you very much.
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